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Accountability or Attestation? An Assessment of Butler’s Ethical 
Subject with the Help of Ricoeur 
 
In Giving an Account of Oneself (2005) Judith Butler investigates the possibility of ethics 
starting from a poststructuralist subject position. Whereas in earlier works, with concepts 
such as “performativity,” Butler put the ethical and critical capacities of the subject into 
perspective, works such as Giving an Account of Oneself, Precarious Life (2004) and to 
some extent Antigone’s Claim (2000), give the impression of a “turn” to ethics.  
In the paper I will evaluate the notion of the ethical subject that Butler uses in 
these works by confronting it with Ricoeur’s ethical self, as developed in Oneself as 
Another (1992). In the first part, I will describe the features of Butler’s “turn to ethics” 
and will demonstrate that for her ethics is not a separate sphere, apart from politics, but is 
located within the political sphere. As a consequence, Butler’s ethical work is consistent 
with the earlier notions of performativity (Bodies That Matter 1993) and social existence 
(The Psychic Life of Power 1997). In the second part of the paper, I will concentrate upon 
her subject notion, especially in Giving an Account of Oneself, and confront it with 
Ricoeur’s ethical self. Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics is not often considered 
in feminist theory. I will show that his conception of the ethical self as ipse can help to 
elucidate and evaluate Butler’s ethical subject. 
 
In Giving an Account of Oneself Judith Butler develops an ethics of accountability. 
Whereas in earlier works she reflected upon the performative process in which the 
subject comes into existence (1993) and upon its social existence (1997), in her recent 
works she explicitly speaks of ethical subjectivity and responsibility. She asks whether a 
theory of subject-formation that acknowledges the limits of self-knowledge can work in 
the service of a conception of ethics: “Does the postulation of a subject who is not self-
grounding, that is, whose conditions of emergence can never be fully accounted for, 
undermine the possibility of responsibility and, in particular, of giving an account of 
oneself?” (2005: 19).   
Butler shows the close connection between ethics and politics, responsibility and 
critique, which implies that her “ethical turn” is in line with her earlier works. Giving an 
account of oneself takes place within power relationships. The ethical demand gives rise 
to the political account, she claims in discussing Foucault’s notion of parrhesia (telling 
the truth about oneself). Ethics is not credible unless it becomes critique. But what does 
that imply for ethical subjectivity? 
For Butler the ethical subject comes into existence in a response to someone else’s 
query or attribution, and its account takes the form of a narrative. She does not consider 
the narrative as reflection after the deed, but claims that it constitutes “the prerequisite 
condition for any account of moral agency we might give” (2005: 12). Therefore, 
narrative capacity constitutes a precondition for giving an account of oneself and 
assuming responsibility for one’s actions.  In a dialogue with Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s 
account of morality, she develops her notion of ethical subjectivity into one that implies a 
creative impulse, but is not a self-berating psychic agency. It is “neither fully determined, 
nor radically free” (2005: 19).  
For Ricoeur ethical subjectivity includes narrativity as well. Personal identity is 
narrative for him, and narrative identity forms the mediator between idem and ipse, 
between sameness and selfhood. Idem identity is the permanency of fingerprints, or one’s 
genetic code, and on the psychological level of one’s character, while ipse identity refers 
to the willed and sustained constancy of the promise that one holds on to even if 
everything around oneself, including one’s inclinations, have changed (1992: 124). For 
Ricoeur ipse expresses a self-constancy that can only be inscribed in the dimension of 
“who?”, and that has nothing to do with the permanence of time that characterizes idem, 
or character.  
Narrative identity combines idem and ipse for Ricoeur: it implies a dialectic 
between self constancy and the relative non-constancy of the promise. But the ethical 
subject is developed by him as ipse, rather than as constant idem. It is the attesting self 
that is ethical, the self that responds to accusation in the form of “It’s me here”. It is not a 
self same I that for Ricoeur constitutes ethical subjectivity, but the self that trusts in itself 
to say and act, and that only has a relative self assurance.  
In confronting Butler’s and Ricoeur’s notion of ethical subjectivity, I aim at 
examining Butler’s notion subject. To the extent that her ethical self is characterised by 
dispossession of itself, it seems to be only idem identity. As a self, that constitutes itself 
in the process of reiterating social norms, it is a what, rather than a who. But in so far as 
ethics requires risking ourselves, in the divergence of what conditions us and what lies 
before us, it seems closer to ipse.  
Both notions of ethical subjectivity give way to different conceptions of ethics: 
Butler develops an ethics of accountability, Ricoeur an ethics of attestation. In the paper, 
I will not only reflect upon the relations between both ethics, but also ask which one is 
more fruitful from a feminist perspective. 
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